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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

DAVE ORTIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

:
:

Case No. 920563-CA

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred oit the court pursuant to Utah Code
I ! "i 11

a

circuit court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final order

a misdemeanor offense

n this case

rionorable I 3 oy d Gowans
Sal

Lake County,

State

:
Utah,

rendered

final

r

judgment and

conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
R U L E S #

S T A T p T E S

Mjm

C 0 N S T I T 0 T I 0 N A L

The pertinent parts ot the following

p R 0 V I S I 0 N S

rules, statutes and

coi is tji tu t:i <::: i ita ] pr c:>i i i si oi is a r e pi: ::> s r:i ded :i i i Addendum,.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953 as amended);
Amendment IV, United States Constitution
Article I, §§ 7 and 14, Utah Constitution
Utah Rules of Evidence 601, 701
Salt Lake City Code § 12.36.040
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Did the officer

stop Mr. Ortiz based

pretext to search :.. evidence

on an illegal

a more serious crime.

Standard of Review:
"Whether a traffic stop was an
unconstitutional "pretext" stop requires a legal c o n c l u s i o n —
thus we review it for "correctness." State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d
1040, 1044 (Utah App. 1992)
1
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II.

Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr.

Ortiz.
Standard of Review: The determination as to whether probable
cause to arrest exists is a question of law which this Court
reviews for correctness.
The factual determinations
underlying the legal conclusions are given deference and
subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. See
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah App. 1991); Beck v.
Ohio. 379 U.S. 89f 92-3, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).
STATEMENT OF CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On July 15, 1992 Judge Floyd H. Gowans heard Dave C. Ortiz'
(hereafter Ortiz) motion to suppress evidence obtained following
his stop by a Salt Lake City police officer. See Motion to Suppress
Transcript

(hereafter

Tr.)

Ortiz

argued

that

the

stop was

pretextual and the detention was without reasonable suspicion. Tr.
20 The trial court denied the motion. (A copy of the trial judge's
oral findings and conclusions are attached as addendum B) . On July
23, 1992 Mr. Ortiz entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.

1988), reserving the right

to appeal the issues raised at the suppression hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of February 28, 1992 at approximately 8:45
p.m., Officer Michael Beasley stopped two individuals of Mexican
descent in a 1983 Buick LeSabre.

(Tr. 1, 2, 12, 13). In addition

to the officer, Calvin Sandoval, a passenger in Mr. Ortiz's car,
testified

at the motion to suppress hearing.

Mr. Sandoval,

testified that on the evening in question he and Mr. Ortiz left Mr.
Ortiz' home and proceeded

immediately

to the area of arrest

(Westbound on 100 South) and at no time did they entered the 76
2
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club parking lot or pulled out of that parking lot. (Tr. 9-10, 13).
As they turned left into a 45 degree angle parking space at the
side of the road, across the street from the 76 Club, Mr. Ortiz
reduced his rate of speed and signaled.

At the time Mr. Ortiz

executed the turn his car was the only vehicle on the road.
11, 12, 1 4 ) .

(Tr.

Just prior to turning into the parking space Mr.

Sandoval noticed that across the street behind the 76 club was the
reflection from a motorcycle headli glit
after their vehicle was stopped
officer

approach

(Tr. 11, ] 4 , • II 6)

Only

in the parking place did the

the car with his motorcycle.

(Tr. 11)

Mr.

Sandoval was familiar with the area, having ] i ved I n the immediate
vicinity for 6 months and driven through the intersection at which
the stop occurred more than once a week during that time. (Tr. 11,
12)

Mr. Sandoval had only 1 beer on the evening in question. (Tr.

14).
Officer

Beasley

testified

that

hie stopped

Mr

Ortiz

for

impeding traffic, however, no citation was issued and he could not
remember if he might have told Mr. Ortiz that he was stopping him
for making a U turn. (Tr. 7, 8) His testimony regarding Mr, Ortiz'
driving pattern, which constituted the offense for which the stop
occurred was varied and contradictory.

Specifically the officer

stated: "Mr. Ortiz pulled across the street southbound, blew across
100 South southbound,"

"Mr. Ortiz' vehicle was had stopped in the

lane, the travel lane of which I was In," "he was backing...just
backing slowly," "I just saw him in motion slowly driving across
the roadway," and finally, the officer conceded that Mr. Ortiz had
3
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not been backing across the street at all, but rather pulling
foreword across the street. (Tr. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 18). The officer
indicated that he did not see Mr. Ortiz exit the 76 Club parking
area and after reviewing his report changed his testimony to say
that he had seen Mr. Ortiz exit the parking area (Tr. 6-7). The
officer's testimony was further inconsistent in that he testified
that Mr. Ortiz told him he was coming from the 76 club and later
conceded that Mr. Ortiz had in fact told him that he was coming
from his home. (Tr. 6-7). The officer arrested Mr. Ortiz based on
information obtained following the stop. (Tr. 19)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Officer Beasley used the allegation that Mr. Ortiz was
impeding traffic as a pretext to stop and search for evidence of a
more serious crime, specifically that Mr. Ortiz was driving under
the influence of alcohol. This stop was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I §§7 and
14 of the Utah Constitution.
The trial court/s finding that Officer Beasley's reasonable
suspicion

that

Mr.

Ortiz

was

impeding

traffic

was

clearly

erroneous. The officer's testimony was internally inconsistent and
contradicted by that of witness Calvin Sandoval.

Therefore, the

officer lacked reasonable suspicion that Mr. Ortiz was engage in a
criminal act and the stop of his vehicle was in violation of his
Article I, §§ 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution and Utah Code Ann. 777-2 (1953 as amended).
4
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ARGUMENT
p 0 I N T lm T j i e officer stopped Mr. Ortiz based on an illegal
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime, thus
violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I §§ 7 and 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
The stop of a vehicle and detention ol its occupants is a
seizure within

the definition

of

the

fourth

and

fourteenth

amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I §14 of
the Utah Constitution, giving rise to I he right to be tree from
unreasonable search and seizure. Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648,
653 (1979); Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Ut. App. 1992) Therefore,
a

stop

of

a vehicle

"must

comport with

the

constitutional

protection afforded by the fourth amendment" as well as those of
Article I §§14 and 7 of the Utah Constitution, an officer must have
reasonable suspicion that a crime was or had occurred prior to a
traffic stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App

1988);

See also. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991); Utah Code Ann. 77-7-2 (1952 as
amended).

The determination of whether an officer had reasonable

suspicion to stop an individual is based on the "totality of the
circumstances

confronting

the

officer

at

the

time

of

the

seizure....the officer is entitled to assess the facts facing him
(or her) in light of his experience, (citations omitted) Sierra, at
975.
An

officer

may

stop

an

individual

for

a traffic

code

violation, however, he may not use such a violation as a pretext to
5
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search for evidence of a more serious crime. State v. Parker. 834
P.2d 592 (1992), Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977.
In Utah, the pretext doctrine applies in cases where an
officer claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor
traffic violation, but where the court determines the
stop was not made because of the traffic violation but
rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and,
therefore, the officer has deviated from the normal
course of action expected of a reasonable officer.
Lopez. 831 P.2d at 1043, See also. United States v. Guzman. 864
P.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988).

This doctrine prevents abuse of

exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, protects
citizens from arbitrary actions by police officers, supports the
fourth amendment's

requirement

of objective reasonableness to

support any invasion by law enforcement, See Maryland v. Macon. 472
U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783 (1985); Scott v. United
States. 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723

(1978) and

requires courts to focus on the realities of police practices —not
pretenses— thus protecting the integrity of the courts.

See

United States v. Keller. 499 F.Supp. 415, 418 (N.D. 111. 1980),
State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990).

"Allowing police

officers to stop vehicles for any minor violation when the officer
in fact is pursuing a hunch would allow officers to seize almost
any

individual

objectives

on

the

basis

of

otherwise

unconstitutional

To permit police officers to use any minor traffic

violation as a pretext to stop a vehicle encourages the selective
enforcement of traffic regulations against minorities..."

Lopez.

831 P.2d at 1045, 1046.
This court has held that the standard for determinations of
6
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reasonable suspicion

is "the totality of the circumstances."

Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977. The subjective intent of the officer is
irrelevant in making these determinations. Id.

The only question

is "...whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in
the absence of illegitimate motivation."

Id. at 978 (quoting

United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986).
standard

"provides

[for]

meaningful

discretionary police action."

judicial

review

This
of

Guzman. 864 P.2d at 1517.

In the present case two Mexican individuals in a mid-size car
on the West side of Salt Lake City near a bar were stopped at
approximately 8:45 p.m. for allegedly impeding traffic when the car
stopped slowly crossed the street into a 45 degree angle parking
space on the side of the road.

The only traffic was the officer

conducting the stop. (Tr. 1, 2, 12, 13).1
Utah's appellate courts have on three occasions held that
reasonable suspicion was not present in cases in which a slow rate
of speed by the suspect's vehicle was an element of the officers
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. State v. Carpena, 714
P.2d 674 (Utah 1986)(a slow moving car with out-of- state plates
driving through an area where frequent burglaries occurred at 3
a.m. was not sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion) ; State v.
Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) (officer stopped a vehicle

1

The race of Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Sandoval is relevant in the
present case because, as this court has noted "many pretext stop
cases involve minorities...We are mindful that law enforcement
officials often use racial characteristics as a basis for "hunch"
criminal profiles in pretextual traffic stops." Lopezf 831 P.2d at
1046, See also Arrovo. 770 P.2d at 155.
7
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for violating Utah law requiring slower vehicles in the left lane
to yield to traffic approaching from behind was not sufficient
basis for reasonable suspicion to stop.)? State v. Thorsness, 778
P.2d 1011 (stopping a vehicle traveling 20 mph in a 40 mph zone
late at night did not constitute reasonable suspicion that a crime
was occurring. While impeding traffic was not specific alleged in
any of the above cases, in each case the vehicles were traveling
slower that the approaching officer thus, the driving patterns were
similar and logical consequence of driving slowly would be impeding
traffic.

The court's must avoid placing form over substance and

look to the actual facts of the case and not the label placed on
the driving pattern by an officer who is trained to providing the
proper label to justify a stop. As in Thorsness. Carpena, Sierra,
Mr. Ortiz was merely driving slowly and approaching a parking place
with caution.

See Supra 12.

The totality of the circumstances in the present case indicate
that the officer's allegation of impeding traffic was a pretext in
which the officer could use to investigate whether two Hispanic
individuals on the westside of Salt Lake City, in the vicinity of
a bar, late at night were driving while under the influence of
alcohol.
POINT II: Mr. Ortiz' detention by the officer was not
supported by reasonable suspicion violating the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I §§
7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing the trial court
found that the officer testified "that a vehicle whether it's
backing, moving in a forward direction or making a turn or coming
8
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straight out of a parking lot any of those maneuvers would be legal
assuming that there's no traffic on the road with which it would
interfere."

(Tr. 24) The trail judge went on to state,

"we're looking at questions of fact, but a vehicle
stopping in that position as has been testified to by the
officer certainly would be far more than probable cause.
The officer would be derelict in his duty if he did not
investigate to see what was wrong. It has nothing to do
with whether the individual is intoxicated. It may be a
serious ill person, it may be an incompetent driver, it
may be a person who doesn't know how to drive. There's
many reasons why a vehicle would pull into a position
like that and then stop and so looking at the testimony
from the officer's position he would have been derelict
in his duty had he not investigated2... .Now opposing
that is Mr. I'm sorry I've forgotten the gentleman's name
but the witness, his testimony that they came from a
different direction, that they were performing a
different maneuver and that the officer wasn't driving
down the street. That's a question of fact and therefore
the motion to suppress is denied."
(Tr.25)3 These brief findings neglect to address the officer's
2

The trail judge found that there were many reasons that a
vehicle would stop in the road as the officer alleged that Mr.
Ortiz did, all requiring that an officer stop and investigate.
However, absent reasonable suspicion that a crime has been
committed or an emergency an officer has no right to stop a
vehicle. Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043. In the present case there was no
evidence that the officer suspected that there was an emergency
situation or an incompetent driver.
3

In the case of State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-789
(Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court for more detailed findings regarding the conflict in
testimony concerning the seizure of a defendant. As the Supreme
Court noted issues of search and seizure are highly fact sensitive
and detailed findings "are necessary to enable this court to
meaningfully review the issues on appeal." Id, at 789.
In
the present case the trial court made no factual findings regarding
the conflicting testimony of Mr. Sandoval and the officer. The
extent of the trial court's ruling on this matter consisted of the
following, "Now opposing that is Mr. I'm sorry I've forgotten the
gentleman's name but the witness, his testimony that they came form
a different direction that they were performing a different
maneuver and that the officer wasn't driving down the street.
That's a question of fact and therefore the motion to suppress is
9
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frequent internal inconsistencies in his testimony and ongoing
correction of his testimony to bring it in line with the statements
documented in his police report.

In contrast to the officer's

testimony Mr. Sandoval's testimony had no inconsistencies, was
presented in a clear manner, he did not refer to any written notes
to correct his testimony, was unwavering in his presentation of the
facts and testified that he had only one beer, thus, it is unlikely
that his perception of the evenings events was not impaired by
alcohol.
Testimony of an officer concerning facts within the realm of
common knowledge to the average individual, such as where the
officer's vehicle was in relation to Mr. Ortiz' car, should not be
given more weight based on the mere fact that the witness is an
officer.

It is true that on the issue of reasonable suspicion the

officer's testimony as to what a reasonable officer is to be given
weight over that of a lay witness, but this deference does not
extend to facts that are within realm of a lay witness.

See,

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; Utah Rules of Evidence 601, 701.
The officer's changing testimony4 indicates that the officer
denied." It appears that the trial court did not consider any
conflict because the issue is factual and not legal. However,
issues of reasonable suspicion and pretext doctrine are highly
fact sensitive questions in which the trial court must make
determination of fact on which to base the legal conclusion. Id.
789. For these reasons of it is appropriate that this Court remand
this case for specific factual findings.
4

Specific
examples
of the officer
changing and
contradictory testimony include that fact that Mr. Ortiz was
stopped for impeding traffic, however, no citation was issued and
the officer could not remember if he might have told Mr. Ortiz that
he was stopping him for making a U turn. (Tr. 7,8) In discussing
10
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was merely looking for a valid legal reason to substantiate the
stop after the fact.

In light of the apparent failure to consider

or give the testimony of Mr. Sandoval due weight the trial court's
finding that the officer stopped Mr. Ortiz because he was impeding
traffic, specifically himself is clearly erroneous.
The testimony presented at suppression hearing supports Mr.
Ortiz' position that the officer alleged the impeding violation
only after making the stop and determining that Mr. Ortiz was
intoxicated.

Specifically, Mr. Ortiz was not charge with impeding

traffic, however, the charge of Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol the officer charged him with the lesser offense of having
an

Open . Container

of

Alcohol

in

a

Vehicle.

(Information)

Supporting the premiss that the officer did not merely give Mr.
Ortiz a break by citing him only with the principle offense.
A search of Utah case law revealed no cases addressing the
issue of reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based on impeding
traffic, however, in Sandy City v. Thorsness. 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah
App. 1989) this court held that stopping a vehicle for driving at

Mr. Ortiz' driving pattern the officer testified: "Mr. Ortiz pulled
across the street southbound, blew across 100 South southbound,"
"Mr. Ortiz' vehicle was had stopped in the lane, the travel lane of
which I was in," "he was backing.. .just backing slowly," "I just
saw him in motion slowly driving across the roadway," and finally,
the officer conceded that Mr. Ortiz had not been backing across the
street at all, but rather pulling foreword across the street. (Tr.
2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 18). He also indicated that he did not see Mr.
Ortiz exit the 76 Club parking area and after reviewing his report
changed his testimony to say that he had seen Mr. Ortiz exit the
parking area (Tr. 6-7). Finally, the officer was inconsistent in
first testifying that Mr. Ortiz told him he was coming from the 76
club and later conceded that Mr. Ortiz had in fact told him that he
was coming from his home. (Tr. 6-7).
11
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a slow rate of speed was insufficient basis for to stop a vehicle.
See Supra 12.

In Thorsness the vehicle in question proceeded at

twenty miles per hour in a forty mile per hour zone. In that case
this court noted, "Defendant did not commit any traffic violations
and traffic was not impeded as there was none in the area at that
hour.11

Thorsness, 778 P.2d at 1012.

At first appearance the

present case appears to be distinguishable from Thorsness based on
the finding that no traffic was impeded. However, if the specific
facts of each case are considered and not the labels given the
driving patterns by the testifying officers the similarities are
striking.

As in Thorsness the only vehicles on the road were

defendant's and the officer's, it was late evening in both cases
and both cars were proceeding at a slow rate of speed.

The

difference in the two cases lies in the labeling of the facts by
Officer Beasley thus, clouding the issue of whether a reasonable
officer would have stopped Mr. Ortiz for impeding traffic.

As in

Thorsness, Mr. Ortiz was merely proceeding at a slow rate of speed,
however, he had the logical explanation that he was attempting to
park his vehicle.

In Thorsness this court found no reasonable

suspicion to stop the defendant even absent an explanation for his
driving pattern, for these reasons there was no legitimate basis
for the stop of Mr. Ortiz' vehicle.
Assuming, arguendo, that the officer was in fact stopped in
the roadway while Mr. Ortiz executed his turn into the 45 degree
angle parking space for several seconds, this still does not raise
to the level of a traffic violation. (Tr. 2, 11-12).

12
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Salt Lake

City Code §12.36.040 provides,
No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such slow speed
as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement
of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for
safe operation or to comply with law.(Emphasis added)
In the present case Mr. Ortiz was merely operating his vehicle
within the exception to the code section, "when... necessary for
safe operation."

It is unrealistic and unsafe to assume that an

individual pulling off a roadway and into a 45 degree angle parking
space at the side of the road would not substantially slow the
speed of the vehicle. Even the officer conceded that this would be
an appropriate action. (Tr. 19).
The allegation of impeding traffic when only the officer is on
the street creates a catchall traffic violation in which an officer
can

allege

any

time he has a hunch

and wishes

to

further

investigate an individual, opening the door for the officers use of
his discretionary power to violate individuals constitutional
rights.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction

and remand this case for a new trial absent the

illegally seized evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of January, 1993.

tyUrR^^

^KkMM-

DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their i*:
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreal
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, as:
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cau*
supported bv Oath or affirmation, and particular!)
describing the place to be searched, and the per>on»
or things to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec, 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or propim
erty, without due process of law.
*

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbiddi-n _
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in ih#-ir j^.r
sons, houses, papers and effects against u n r e a - , ^
searches and seizures shall not be violated. .:r.d n,
warrant shall issue but upon probable cau— -u.
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly de-eni.:n.
the place to be searched, and the person or thmj i«, ^
seized.
I%l

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES.
Rule 601. General rule of competency.
(a) General rule of competency. Even* person is
competent to be a witness except as otherwise pro*
vided in these rules.
(b) Statement of declarant in action for his
wrongful death. Evidence of a statement by the deceased is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
offered against the plaintiff in an action for wrongful
death.
(o Statement of decedent offered in action
against his estate.
(1) Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in an
action upon a claim or demand against the estate
of the declarant if the statement was made upon
the personal knowledge of the declarant at a time
when the matter had been recently perceived by
him and while his recollection was clear.
(2) Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this section if the statement was made under
circumstances such as to indicate its lack of
trustworthiness.
ARTICLE VII. OPLNIONS AND EXPERT
TESTIMONY.
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
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UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
T7-7-2. By peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer,
"presence" includes all of the physical senses or
any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity,
or range of any physical sense, or records the
observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a
felony has been committed and has reasonable
cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe
the person has committed a public offense, and
there is reasonable cause for believing the person
may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person.
1986

12.36.030

DRIVING TOO SLOW.

No person snail arive a motor vehicle at S-JCT slow s;>e*fl as - 3 , „ ™ .
or OIOCK :.ne normal ana reasonable novtnent f
ra^c
xc 3
reduce* speeo is necessary for safe o p t i o n or zo comply " f .
ut.
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F:

this motorcycle parks in that neighborhood never west of 9th
as the officer testified to. What we really have to look at is

did the officer have an articulable reason to stop this vehicle.
The answer is yes. This car stopped in front of him.

Stayed there

for several seconds by his testimony. Where Ms. Mendez is getting
the sketchy elements from this report confuses me because the report
is very clear.

It doesn't talk about backing.

make that mistake in his testimony.

Officer Beasley did

It does talk about this car

pulling slowly across the lane of traffic, impeding his progress to
the extent that he had to come to a complete stop and wait while the
pulled out of the way.

That's all that's required for him to go up

and begin his conversation with him.

At that point we'll take that

up at the court or at the trial, but up to that point he has every
reason and every reasonable officer would be expected to make
contact who has just stopped and caused traffic to stop.
JUDGE:

What we have here is obviously a question of fact. The

officer has testified and our standard in this proceeding is
probable cause.
ATD:

The officer's testified that a vehicle

Excuse me your honor, I believe that the standard would be

a reasonable suspicion to stop.

I'm not challenging the arrest but

rather the stop.
ATP:

That is correct which is a lower standard.

ATD:

I just want the record to be accurate.

ATP:

And I believe that is correct.

The standard in Utah right

now is reasonable suspicion to stop.
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jTJDGE:

Or probable cause.

ATP:

Or probable cause to arrest.

JUDGE:

Ya, that's what I said.

He has testified that a vehicle

whether it's backing, moving in a forward direction or making a turn
or coming straight out of a parking lot any of those maneuvers would
be legal assuming that there's no traffic on the road with which it
would interfere.

He has testified that when it gets into his lane

of traffic that the vehicle stops and sits there.
stops.
curb.

He pulls up and

The vehicle then either backs or goes forward again onto the
Now certainly a vehicle stopping in that position again, as

I've said, we're looking at questions of fact, but a vehicle
stopping in that position as has been testified to by the officer
certainly would be far more than probable cause.

The officer would

be derelict in his duty if he did not investigate to see what was
wrong.

It has nothing to do with whether the individual is

intoxicated.

It may be a serious ill person, it may be an

incompetent drive, it may be a person who doesn't know how to
drive.

There's many reasons why a vehicle would pull into a

position like that and then stop and so looking at the testimony
from the officer's position he would have been derelict in his duty
had he not investigated.

And of course the Parker case

is not

applicable because obviously a DUI arrest and looking for a burglary
suspect are two different matters.

The officer becomes aware in

most cases of a DUI offense when he approaches the driver and finds
out the driver's condition.
than in a burglary case.

That's something entirely different

And so at the time of the stop it's not
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expected necessarily that you will escalate a matter into a DUI
offense.

That happens just from further observations. Now opposing

that is Mr. I'm sorry I've forgotten the gentleman's name but the
witness, his testimony that they came from a different direction
that they were performing a different maneuver and that the officer
wasn't driving down the street. That's a question of fact and
therefore the motion to suppress is denied.
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